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Improvised Explosive Device Network Analysis
• IEDNA utilizes network analysis methods 
to fill gaps in the understanding and 
visualization of IED networks
Typical network analysis of illicit 
networks focuses on the human 
participants
• In the case of IED networks these would be 
emplacers, financiers, bomb-makers, etc.
• This is problematic because the intelligence 
relied upon (HUMINT, SIGINT) is frequently 
incomplete and/or inaccurate because it is 
subject to deception efforts
• Typical intelligence sources are also much 
more demanding from the perspective of time
– HUMINT sources need to be vetted
– SIGINT sources need to be translated
– Multiple sources are needed to be 
valuable for the end-user
A typical map of IED “atmospherics”
• How useful is this?
• How can I “attack the network?”
IEDNA Overview
IEDNA Overview
• IEDNA focuses on the physical 
components of the individual IEDs and 
what these components can tell/show 
us about the IED network(s)
• To enable this analysis, we built a 
mobile IED INTEL collection application 
that allows for real-time on-scene data 
collection that:
– Structures Collected IED data
– Automatically generates IED incident 
report(s)
– Reduces operating burden on EOD 
Technicians
– Allows for rapid Tactical Level Intel 
feedback of IED operating environment
– Allows C-IED forces to isolate targets of 








• By taking a two-pronged approach to 
analyzing IED component data
1. Improving on-scene collection capability that 
structures the data in a way that is easily 
imported into network analysis tools
2. Applying component level analysis
• We can gain a much better ability to fill 
gaps in the knowledge of IED networks 
that are otherwise left empty
– IEDNA makes it possible for an analyst to
• More clearly define the specific network of 
interest
• Identify likely bomb-making cells / individuals
• Increase the value of HUMINT and SIGINT 
reporting
• Increase the chances for justification of Direct 
Action on bomb-making groups and individuals
• Zero in on more specific  geographic areas of 
interest
• Justify ISR collections requests empirically
• Track and link together IED components and 
events across regional and national boundaries
– In a drastically faster Processing, Exploitation, 
Dissemination cycle
• In minutes or hours vice weeks and months
Entire IED Network
• 235 Incidents







• Sorted by explosive type
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• Sorted by explosive type
HUMINT, SIGINT or Biometrics data that ties
an individual or group to one incident can
now be assessed with high confidence to tie
that group or individual to multiple incidents
IEDNA Overview
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New RCIED, HME sub-network
areas of interest
• Reduces focus from 187 square miles
to two 9 square mile areas
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• Bottom Line / Big Picture
– IEDNA is not a silver bullet
• There will never be one
– It does fill a gap in knowledge by properly utilizing 
data that is already being collected
• These techniques are proven and validated, and are 
therefore powerful tools that give commanders more options 
in the F3EA cycle:
– Empirically justify Collections Emphasis Requests
– Satisfy legal justifications for Direct Action
– Identify supply chain similarities within IED networks and sub-
networks
IEDNA Overview
• Bottom Line / Big Picture (continued)
– It also allows an analyst to quickly sort through 
massive datasets that currently entail hundreds of 
hours of analyst legwork
• By quickly sorting through the IED component variables, an 
analyst can zero in on a sub-network of interest
• Including isolating for specific components that may be 
moving across regional and national boundaries
– Again, EOD techs are already required to collect this 
type of data
• Our application allows them to collect it in a way that 
structures the data and reduces the reporting burden
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